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When no news is bad news: communication failures 
and the hidden assumptions that threaten safety 
Communication failures in healthcare can be catastrophic. Lost test results, de-
layed diagnoses, missing handover information: all can have serious impacts on 
the safety of care with tragic consequences for patients. Even seemingly trivial 
mishaps can result in disaster. For example, a young mother died after two re-
ferral letters were inadvertently addressed to number 16, rather than number 
1b, on the road where she lived, meaning diagnosis and treatment of cancer was 
significantly delayed. Her 10 year survival at the initial point of referral was esti-
mated as 92%.(1) In another case, a patient died of a major haemorrhage during 
surgery after pre-prepared, cross-matched blood had been incorrectly sent back 
to the blood bank due a single character in the patient’s name being mis-
spelled.(2) These cases, and many others, point to one of the most insidious 
risks associated with communication in healthcare: many communicative pro-
cesses are still commonly viewed as rather mundane administrative tasks—in-
stead of safety-critical processes that are essential to safe care.  
 
The lack of attention that is paid to the reliability of some communication 
processes has recently been revealed on a dramatic scale, with the publication of 
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an investigation into the major failures affecting the handling of clinical corre-
spondence in the NHS.(3) A backlog of 709,000 items were found to have accu-
mulated over several years in storage rooms and archives operated by NHS 
Shared Business Services (SBS), and to date almost 1,800 patients have been 
identified who may have suffered potential harm. Across healthcare, a variety of 
sophisticated work is being done to understand and improve the reliability of 
many communication systems(4)—such as the handling of test results,(5,6) the 
transfer of clinical information(7,8) and patient handover processes.(9) But this 
massive communication breakdown in the handling of clinical correspondence, 
along with many other events, points to something fundamental that needs ad-
dressing right across our healthcare systems: the hidden assumptions that peo-
ple hold about what constitutes a reliable communicative process and what safe 
communication looks like. These assumptions influence both the behaviour of 
health professionals and the design and implementation of communication pro-
cesses, and can lie at the heart of why communication systems so often break-
down.  
 
 
Assuming the worst or hoping for the best? 
 
 
Much of the communication that occurs in healthcare is safety-critical—from 
patient handover to arranging referrals to delivering test results. Increasingly, 
information systems are being designed to take account of that. However, the 
reliability of communicative systems and practices are heavily shaped by the 
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fundamental assumptions of the people who are doing the communi-
cating.(10,11) These assumptions can influence the most basic aspects of com-
munication, such as what is viewed as an acceptable communicative practice, 
when and if confirmatory messages are sought or expected, and which infor-
mation is considered critical and which is not. How these assumptions can 
shape the safety of communication systems is perhaps well illustrated by a per-
sonal story.  
 
Not long ago I had a couple of very minor surgical procedures. From start to 
finish I encountered dedicated, skilled and caring people doing their best for pa-
tients. And yet one small moment shocked me—a moment with deep implica-
tions for how we organise and think about our most basic systems of communi-
cation. My operations were small and routine—the excision of an abnormal 
mole, then a much larger excision following the lab results. After the first exci-
sion I was told with a cheery smile, “We'll send that off to be tested. If you don't 
hear from us then everything's fine.” To someone who has been fortunate to re-
search, work in and generally hang around safety-critical organisations for the 
past 15 years, this was immediately alarming.  
 
One of the most basic assumptions of any high-reliability practice is that no 
news is most certainly not good news.(12) Hearing nothing does not mean that 
nothing is wrong. Yet here the default assumption was the opposite: no news 
was good news. If I didn’t hear anything about my test results, then I should as-
sume things are fine. Either that, I thought, or the specimen had been misla-
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belled. Or the lab didn’t receive it. Or the results were lost in transit. Or my con-
tact details had gone astray. Or any one of the countless other failures that can 
beset even the most trivial of communicative processes had come to pass. 
Where safety is concerned, no news is not good. As a commercial-pilot-turned-
air-accident-investigator told me bluntly years ago: “no news means your radio 
has probably failed.” In a safety-critical process—such as the handling of im-
portant test results—the absence of a confirmation message should be perceived 
as a warning: a sign that the communicative system itself has broken down. 
Disasters at sea and in the sorting office 
 
The default assumption that no news is not good news is the bedrock of many 
safety-critical industries. It has been learnt time and again through tragedy. 
This year marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry 
disaster. On 6th March 1987, the ferry capsized outside the Belgian port of Zee-
brugge. The bow doors had been left open allowing water to flood in, tipping the 
ship in a mere 90 seconds. The assumption on the bridge was ‘no news is good 
news’. Unless they were told otherwise, they assumed the bow doors had been 
shut and it was safe to set sail. But the doors were not shut and that assumption, 
combined with a range of other factors, cost 193 people their lives.(13) By coin-
cidence, the thirtieth anniversary of the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster came 
only a few days after the systemic breakdown in NHS clinical correspondence 
handling was made public.(14) Subsequent investigation by the National Audit 
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Office revealed that 709,000 items of clinical correspondence failed to be deliv-
ered between 2011 and 2016 and accumulated in storage rooms.(3) This corre-
spondence included test results, clinical notes and child protection conference 
notes. Ongoing reviews suggest that, as of 31 May 2017, around 1,788 patients 
may have suffered potential harm as a result. This number is expected to rise as 
175,000 items are still to be reviewed.  
 
These failures in the handling of clinical correspondence represent a deep 
and systemic communicative breakdown on a remarkable scale. A set of unfor-
tunate assumptions appear to have played a role in shaping the systems and 
practices that caused this breakdown, in three particular ways.(3) First, one rea-
son the backlog of misdirected correspondence grew so large was because there 
were no performance indicators associated with addressing it. Staff therefore as-
sumed that clearing the backlog of failed deliveries was of lower priority than 
other routine sorting and delivery work, and paid it little attention. Second, the 
main problems posed by the accumulating backlog of correspondence appear to 
have been assumed to be largely administrative and financial. The patient safety 
impact of the backlog, and the clinical risks to patients, were not formally recog-
nised by NHS SBS until a report in November 2015. That led to an examination 
of some of the correspondence and a belated realisation of the severity of the sit-
uation in March 2016, five years after the problems began. Third, the scale of 
the backlog was only recognised after a slow process of internal inquiry at NHS 
SBS—including a director overhearing a conversation by chance. It appears that 
the loss of almost three quarters of a million items of clinical correspondence 
was not a strong enough signal of failure to be detected by those relying on these 
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communication channels, or to challenge their assumptions about the reliability 
of this communication system. 
 
 
 
No news is bad news 
 
The assumption that no news is bad news—and that communication processes 
are fragile, prone to failure and need strong systems of internal checks and bal-
ances—have been essential features of safety-critical industries for decades. So 
why are these assumptions not yet systematically embedded in all areas 
healthcare? An easy answer might simply be that healthcare systems are often 
under considerable financial pressure, and are forced to make necessary and 
hard-nosed trade-offs between efficiency and safety. The long-term value of 
many reliability-enhancing practices is not always easy to see, while the short-
term costs are often highly visible—in the form are duplicate checks, additional 
confirmation messages, closed loop communication channels, or redundant 
backup systems. But there also seems to be something more fundamental at 
work. Rather than making a conscious trade-off between safety and efficiency, it 
seems many of the risks associated with failures of communication are not 
widely appreciated in the first place. Assumptions that 'no news is good news' 
can hide the problem itself. The recent large-scale failure of NHS clinical corre-
spondence handling should be a wake-up call—and one in which we must still 
hope that dead letters have not led to dead patients. Ultimately, safe systems of 
communication are built on the deep assumptions and default positions that 
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collectively shape practice. These assumptions determine what is paid attention 
to, what is valued, what is ignored, and how systems are designed and imple-
mented. And ‘no news is good news’ might seem a perfectly reasonable and 
straightforward assumption—until your ship suddenly capsizes. 
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